Among the most significant prerogatives that a chief justice enjoys is one listed nowhere in the United States Code or in the Supreme Court's Rules. It is the customary power to assign the opinion for the Court in any case in which he is in the majority. 1 There is a rich literature on the strategy and constraints involved in exercising this power. 2 Considerably less attention has been paid to the way in which a chief justice deploys the power of self-expression: assigning a majority opinion to himself. 3 I was initially tempted to write, "the ultimate power of self-expression," but of course this is not always or even often accurate. In writing for the majority, a chief justice, no less than any other majority-opinion author, is speaking for the Court, not simply for himself, and if the project
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Among the most significant prerogatives that a chief justice enjoys is the power to assign an opinion when in the majority. While The Behavior of Federal Judges only briefly alludes to "a self-expression component of the judicial utility function" for Supreme Court justices, I will indulge the assumption that there is something special about a chief justice's choice of when to speak for the Court. In this essay, I examine the current chief justice's practice of self-assigning majority opinions, with the goal of comparing his performance to the general patterns established by other chief justices.
by Linda Greenhouse 1. Similarly by custom, when the chief justice has voted in dissent at Conference, the senior associate justice who has voted in the majority makes the assignment. See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make, 125 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press 1998) (reprinting a 1972 memo in which Justice Douglas describes to Chief Justice Burger the Court's internal assignment policies).
2. E.g., Forrest Maltzman, James is to succeed, he must take those steps necessary to persuade at least four colleagues to stay with him. Greater power of self-expression comes to the author of a concurring or dissenting opinion, but even those categories of opinions are bound by constraints for any justice, not only the chief, who keeps reputational and strategic interests in view.
There are other constraints on self-assignment beyond the need to obtain four other signatures. Given the Court's practice of distributing the work evenly-as least in terms of raw numbers of majority opinions, regardless of the diverse challenges posed by individual cases-it would be highly unusual for any justice to write more than two or three majority opinions from any of the two-week sitting periods. 4 So it's incumbent on the chief justice to spread the work around, and to do so with a modicum of fairness. Ever since John Marshall, who replaced the early practice of seriatim opinions with a single opinion for the Court as the norm, chief justices have been moved to assign themselves the most important cases; however, most also seem to have felt some obligation to share at least some of the high-profile assignments while also taking on their share of the "dogs."
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But if self-assignment represents something less than unrestrained self-expression, it is self-expression nonetheless. While The Behavior of Federal Judges only briefly alludes to "a self-expression component of the judicial utility function" for Supreme Court justices, 6 I will indulge the assumption that there is something special about a chief justice's choice of when to speak for the Court. Lawrence Baum tells us "judging can be understood as self-presentation to a set of audiences." 7 For most Supreme Court justices, most of the time the notion of "audience" outside the Court's precincts is an abstraction; few people can name most associate justices or ascribe to them any particular set of opinions. (The flamboyantly outspoken Antonin Scalia, along with Anthony M. Kennedy in his outcome-determinative role at the center of a polarized Court, may be current exceptions, along with Sonia Sotomayor, who seems on the way to rock-star status with the general public.)
But a chief justice occupies a singular role, embodying for many Americans the Court that bears his name and, if he is to be successful, exerting what David Danelski calls "task and social leadership." 8 Speaking for the Court through a self-assigned majority opinion invokes both kinds of leadership. It is an aspect of "task" leadership-the chief justice's job of running the Conference and supervising the flow of opinion assignment and preparation. It is also an aspect of the "social" leadership required to maintain collegial relationships, broker compromise, and present the Court's collective face to the outside world. Danelski notes: "The Chief Justice's retention of 'big cases' is generally accepted by the Justices. In fact, the expectation is that he should write in those cases so as to lend the prestige of his office to the Court's pronouncement." 9 Of course, only a small number of Supreme Court cases concern core questions of constitutional structure or individual rights. But when they do, a majority opinion by the chief justice serves a signaling function: evidence that a question gripping the country has received the Supreme Court's full attention and that the Court's answer bears the imprimatur of the highest judicial officer in the land. Thus 4 . The Supreme Court hears oral argument in seven two-week periods from October through April, typically sitting on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday mornings. These days, the typical number of cases heard per two-week sitting is 12, although the number is often higher in the earlier sittings and lower in the later months.
5. While Marshall himself certainly wrote more than his share of landmark opinions, it's not necessarily the case that every Marshall opinion to which history has given landmark status was so regarded in its day. For a self-described "revisionist look" at this question, see Michael Supreme Court arguments as a government and private lawyer, acclaim for his advocacy skills-it must have been a bit daunting to parachute into a Court whose members had served together for so long and who were still mourning the loss of a well-liked colleague.
Even so, to whatever extent an outsider can know the rules that govern a chief justice's conduct of his office, it's safe to assume that Chief Justice Roberts knew them. (It's also safe to assume that his close observation of the Court had provided him with negative as well as positive models. During his clerkship, Warren Burger was chief justice, and perhaps the young John Roberts observed the pattern described with some asperity in the memoir that Justice John Paul Stevens published in retirement: "... The general point here is that Chief Justice Roberts occupies a conservative center of a very conservative Court. 20 For present purposes, the point is that the chief justice is in a position to assign the great majority 19. I should note at this point that I have kept my own Supreme Court statistics for many years, and, for the sake of consistency, I will rely on them in this article. My judgment calls (e.g. whether to consider a partial concurrence to be a functional dissent) may from time to time differ from others', but that's in the nature of such an exercise. I should also point out that the dissenting votes I refer to here are gross numbers, i.e. all dissenting votes. These data don't capture Justice Kennedy's very particular role in closely divided cases, in which his preferences essentially define a 5-to-4 majority, so I don't mean to cast doubt on his role as the "super median" justice on the current Court. 21. While it is certainly possible to imagine a chief justice who is regularly outvoted, this hasn't been the case in recent decades. In any event, the "opinion assignment ratio" (OAR), as described further below, offers a technique for treating all justices equally, regardless of how often they are in dissent, by looking only at those majority opinions that are available to be assigned to an individual justice-available because that justice has voted with the majority.
22 Almost all students of the selfassignment practices of chief justices have found that chief justices "over assign" major cases to themselves, and Chief Justice Roberts is no exception. Elliot Slotnick, considering Taft through Burger, found that while chief justices assigned themselves the majority opinions in 14.8 percent of the universe of cases in which they were in the majority, the figure rose to 24.8 percent of the "important" cases. This is the "opinion assignment ratio" (OAR), which Slotnick describes as "a simple measure which reports the percentage of the time when a Justice is 'available' for majority opinion assignments that he actually gets the assignment." 30 In his article The Chief Justices and Self-Assignment of Majority Opinions: A Research Note, Slotnick further observes that every chief justice in his database "wrote relatively more opinions in important cases than did their colleagues" and that all had a higher assignment ratio in the important cases than in the case universe as a whole. While six percent of the assignments that went to associate justices were in "important" cases, nearly 12 percent of the chief justices' assignments were in that category.
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From the other end of the telescope: what proportion of the most important cases went to the chief justice? Collecting the work of others who have studied the question going back to Taft, Saul Brenner notes that Chief Justice Taft assigned himself more than one-third of the important majority opinions (ranging from 34 to 38.2 percent, depending on the study). More recently, Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist both assigned themselves one-quarter of the important cases. (These are absolute numbers, not the "opinion assignment ratio," which, as explained above, looks only at "available" opinions.) 32 Brenner's own data differ somewhat; he notes that he considered only a small number of decisions to be salient (437 cases from the first year of John Marshall's tenure as chief justice through the third year of William Rehnquist's.) The average self-assignment ratio across the span of 12 chief justices plus the Rehnquist fraction was 35 percent. 33 Chief Justice Roberts fits this general pattern. Of the 101 decisions I deem salient, the chief justice wrote the majority opinions in 25. He was in the majority in 85 of the 101 cases, meaning that he wrote salient majority opinions in 29 percent of such cases that were available to him. If those 85 assignments had been divided evenly among all justices, each would have written 9.4 majority opinions, implying that Chief Justice Roberts over-assigned salient majority opinions to himself by a factor of three. (Had I applied a more stringent definition of salience, listing not only cases that were important but boiling down the 101 to the 31 most important decisions of the past eight years, the profile would show an even more dramatic over-assignment.) The chief justice was available to write the majority opinion in 25 of the 31 cases (he dissented in five and was recused in one), and of those 25, he assigned himself 10 majority opinions for an OAR of 40 percent. (See Table 2) During the 2005 Term, his first term, he was available for nine out of 13 assignments in salient cases, of which he gave himself three, for an OAR of 33 percent. Although that proved to be his peak OAR, he came close in most subsequent terms: 30. Slotnick, supra n. 3, at 220. 31. Id. at 222. As Slotnick explains in footnote 7 of his article, he uses the "public law" definition of "important"; if a case was discussed in at least two of the sources he lists, it is deemed important.
32. Brenner, supra n. (2012), raised the question of whether in the absence of an explicit statutory right of action, the Supremacy Clause itself could provide-as the Ninth Circuit had held in this case-a private right of action to sue a state for allegedly refusing to follow a federal policy. This portentous question went unanswered in an eightpage opinion by Justice Breyer, who said there was no need to answer it because after the Court's grant of certiorari, the federal government had approved the challenged state policy, erasing the asserted conf lict between the federal and state governments. Consequently, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case. Such a result might have been expected to receive the justices' unanimous assent. But the vote was 5 to 4, with Chief Justice Roberts writing a dissenting opinion-one of only three he published during the term-gratuitously addressing the merits of the issue and clearly drafted to speak for a majority before one or more of his original allies became persuaded that judicial minimalism was the better course under the circumstances.
Hosanna-Tabor was a unanimous decision, while the healthcare decision was, famously, 5 to 4. It is perhaps no coincidence that these were the two Roberts majority opinions in the 2011 Term's salient cases. Across the years, chief justices are most likely to self-assign in unanimous cases on the one hand and in cases that sharply divide the Court on the other. We can speculate as to the reasons for this pattern. The authorship of an opinion for a unanimous Court is the most direct way for a chief justice to display at least the appearance of leadership. Whether real leadership was involved in producing a unanimous result is, of course, a different question. Perhaps the correct outcome of the case was obvious to all the justices, and the chief justice assigned it to himself in order to shoulder his share of easy, less rewarding assignments. Perhaps the decision was unanimous only because the chief justice yielded on important points, or left major questions undecided-a description that could well fit Hosanna-Tabor, which left open the question of how the ministerial exception might apply to employees of a religious institution not directly involved in religious activity. No matter; a unanimous opinion is symbolically expressive, making both the chief and "his" Court look good. During his first term, Chief Justice Roberts might have felt an especially keen desire to speak for a unanimous Court: Of his eight majority opinions during that term, six were in cases decided by votes of 9 to 0 or 8 to 0.
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Given the appeal that a unanimous face has for the Court, why might a chief justice also want to undertake the majority opinion when the Court is most obviously divided? One reason for writing any majority opinion is to retain the maximum possible control over how an issue is framed. Even if compromise proves necessary to hold a fragile majority, it remains the case that it is usually the initial draft of a majority opinion to which other justices must respond. In a 5-to-4 decision, every vote counts, and assuming a higher-37. While one might wonder whether by assigning an opinion to himself, a chief justice increases the chance that the decision will turn out to be unanimous, I have never seen evidence of this kind of "rallying around the chief" on the part of other justices. than-usual degree of engagement on the part of the justices-because often these may be the most salient or ideologically charged cases-it seems natural for the chief justice to want to be in the strongest position to influence the outcome. Elliot Slotnick explains that "being able to make or break a given Court majority" gives the chief justice "added impetus for writing opinions for a highly divided court" regardless of "the resulting negative implications for the Court's symbolic appearance of unity."
38 Thus, Slotnick finds in his survey going back to Taft that chief justices "over assigned" themselves to unanimous cases (especially in important cases). While the over assignment trails off as the Court becomes less cohesive, it rises again in the most closely divided cases. Of his 17 majority opinions in the most closely divided cases, 10 came in salient cases, while of the 23 unanimous opinions, only six were in salient cases. One possible implication of this differential is that Chief Justice Roberts (like his predecessors) chooses to write for a unanimous Court essentially for the sake of symbolic value of unanimity, without much regard for the specifics of the case, while his choice to write in closely divided cases reflects a higher degree of personal commitment to the outcome. This theory may be borne out by comparing the subject of Chief Justice Roberts's overall majority opinion output with his majority opinions in the subset of salient cases. Of his 61 majority opinions, the biggest share, 15 (25 percent), came in the area of criminal law and procedure. (I include habeas corpus cases in this category.) By contrast, among his 25 majority opinions in salient cases, the biggest share, 11 (44 percent), came in First Amendment cases (free speech and the religion clauses), while he wrote in only three salient criminal cases. One might suppose that there were simply more salient First Amendment cases, but that proves not to have been the case. Of the 101 decisions that I have deemed salient over the course of the Roberts Court's eight terms, the number of criminal law and First Amendment cases are nearly equal (25 and 23). So the chief justice's choice to spend his energy and capital on First Amendment cases is quite striking, reflecting the fact that a narrow but determined majority is reshaping First Amendment law by embracing the free speech rights of corporations as a powerful tool of deregulation. In no other category has Chief Justice Roberts written more than three salient majority opinions (the other categories I designated among the salient cases were jurisdiction, including procedure and standing; civil rights; federalism and separation of powers; and administrative law.) Free speech and free exercise both are clearly subjects that engage him and on which he wants to leave a mark. It's not implausible to assume that his eight years in office represent only one-third, or less, of what is likely to be a long tenure for Chief Justice Roberts. His priorities may change, and so may the Court's. It's not possible to predict how the docket may evolve to reflect public concerns and legal developments that have yet to emerge. Yet it seems safe to predict that unless the Court's ideological polarity shifts sharply to the left, his is the voice that we will hear on the subjects that matter most to him and to his Court-and, quite likely, to the country itself. 
